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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE—IN ENACTING THE 
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT, WHOSE STATUTORY 
DAMAGES PROVISION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ON A PER VIOLATION 
BASIS, CONGRESS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS COMMERCE POWER 
AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT—United States v. Gregg, 
226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
(FACE) in 1994 to combat violence directed at providers of reproductive 
health services.  United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000)).  The statute provides for the criminal 
prosecution of protesters who use actual force, or the threat of force, to 
“injure, intimidate or interfere” with persons seeking access to reproductive 
health services.  Id. at 257.  The statute also confers standing on the U.S. 
Attorney General or any injured party to sue protesters for civil remedies.  
Id. at  258. 
After a series of blockade protests at an abortion clinic in Englewood, 
New Jersey, the Newark office of the U.S. Attorney General filed a 
complaint in U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey on April 18, 1997, 
naming thirty abortion protesters as defendants under FACE’s civil action 
provision.  Id. at 256.  The Attorney General’s office sought injunctive 
relief and statutory damages that were available under the statute.  The 
district court, after a preliminary evidentiary hearing, granted an injunction 
against the defendants’ protest activities.  On December 11, 1998, the 
district court entered a final order holding the defendants liable for 
violating FACE with their blockade protests and granting the Attorney 
General’s summary judgment motion.  However, the court adopted the 
defendants’ interpretation of the statutory damages provision and assessed 
damages of five thousand dollars per violation jointly and severally among 
the defendants, not per defendant as the government had argued.  The 
Attorney General appealed the district court’s interpretation of the statutory 
damages provision.  Id. at 257.  Eight defendants filed a cross appeal 
contending that: (1) the Attorney General did not have the option to elect 
statutory damages and was limited to actual damages, (2) Congress did not 
have the power to enact FACE under its commerce power, and (3) FACE 
infringed the defendants’ First Amendment free speech protections. 
Circuit Judge Oakes, sitting by designation and writing for a two-
member majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
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Circuit, held that FACE assigned damages per violation, with joint and 
several liability attaching to each violator.  Id. at 260.  The majority also 
held that Congress acted within its commerce power in enacting FACE, 
and that the statute did not regulate speech protected under the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 262, 267. 
Beginning its analysis, the court first turned to the proper 
interpretation of FACE’s statutory damages provision.  Id. at 257.  The 
court looked to the canon of statutory interpretation that holds if a statute’s 
plain meaning is apparent, resort to other modes of statutory construction is 
unnecessary.  Id.  The court described the plain meaning inquiry as two-
pronged: First the court must consider the express language of the statute, 
and then, to discern Congress’s intent, the court must look to the legislative 
history and climate at the time of the statute’s enactment.  Id.  The court 
found the express language of the FACE statute to be unequivocal.  Id. at 
258.  The court cited Congress’s use of the term “per violation” in the 
statutory damages provision of § 248(c)(1)(B) and contrasted the use of the 
“per violation” language with the permissive civil penalty subsection of the 
statute, where Congress used the terminology “against each respondent.”  
Id.  Finding the “dichotomy of expression” to be persuasive, the court held 
that Congress clearly intended statutory damages to be assessed per 
violation, with joint and several liability attaching to each defendant who 
engaged in the violation.  Id. (citing United States v. Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d 
151, 160 (1998)). 
The court likewise dismissed the Attorney General’s argument that 
the use of the term “whoever” at the beginning of the statute conveyed 
Congress’s intent to hold each defendant responsible for five thousand 
dollars in statutory damages.  Id. at 259.  The court again referred to the 
“per violation” language in the applicable provision, and found that its use 
clearly overcame any prior reference in the statute.  Id. 
The court bolstered its interpretative analysis with an examination of 
FACE’s legislative history and climate at the time the statute was passed.  
Id.  Judge Oakes cited extensive congressional findings that described a 
“campaign of violence” directed at clinics, which had resulted in numerous 
deaths, casualties, and arrests nationwide.  Id.  The court also noted 
evidence that federal law enforcement was needed to remedy the failings of 
state and local authorities on this issue.  Id.  From this history, the court 
summarized the purpose of FACE as two-fold: to provide a remedy to 
compensate persons and clinics that have been harmed, and also to serve as 
a deterrent to would-be protesters.  Id. 
The majority next rejected an argument by the Attorney General that 
Congress intended the court to levy statutory damages on an individual 
basis to serve the deterrent function.  Id at 259-60.  In finding the statute a 
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sufficient deterrent as interpreted, the court pointed to the other options for 
penalty within the statute, including punitive damages, criminal liability, 
and permissive civil penalties.  Id. at 259 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 248(b) & (c) 
(2000)).  Judge Oakes asserted that the statutory damages provision is a 
substitute for actual damages, thereby abrogating the difficulty in proving 
actual harm.  Id.  The majority propounded that the grant of statutory 
damages should not be based on how many violators participated in the 
violation, but on the violation itself, since an action for actual damages 
would only be able to recover on a per violation basis, not per defendant.  
Id. 
Judge Oakes next considered the Attorney General’s argument that a 
“per violation” interpretation of the statute would encourage defendants to 
act en masse.  Id. at 260.  The court found this argument unpersuasive, 
reasoning that because the statute contained a variety of remedies, a 
prospective violator could not know if he faced an even more serious 
penalty than statutory damages, such as criminal prosecution.  Id.  Judge 
Oakes observed that this uncertainty preserved the statute’s deterrent value, 
even with joint and several liability for the five thousand-dollar statutory 
damages attached.  Id. 
Turning to the defendants’ contention that the Attorney General could 
only pursue recovery for actual damages and not statutory damages, the 
court considered whether attorneys general were free to pursue the same 
statutory damages available to private plaintiffs.  Id.  The majority, looking 
to the express language of FACE, held that the Attorney General was free 
to pursue statutory damages as a matter of right since the statute gave 
attorneys general standing to sue for “compensatory damages.”  Id. (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 248 (c)(2)(B) (2000)).  Noting that a prior subsection had 
clearly defined compensatory damages as “actual and statutory damages,” 
the court interpreted this definition, as well as the legislative history, as 
persuasive evidence of Congress’s intent to allow attorneys general to 
choose statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.  Id. at 260-61 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 248 (c)(1)(B) (2000)). 
Judge Oakes next contemplated the defendants’ claim that FACE was 
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power under the 
Constitution.  Id. at 261 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  The court, 
observing that it would be one of the last federal courts of appeal to weigh 
in on this issue, noted that seven other circuit courts had upheld the 
statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, as well as several 
instances in which the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari of the 
issue.  Id. (citations omitted).  The court, noting that congressional action 
was due substantial deference by the court, held that FACE was a proper 
exercise under the Commerce Clause.  Id. 
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Judge Oakes, beginning the constitutional analysis, identified the 
Supreme Court’s recent opinions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), as the 
pertinent sources for Commerce Clause interpretative guidance.  Id. at 261-
62.  Using a rational basis standard, the court asserted that FACE is “a 
proper exercise of Congress’s power to regulate intrastate conduct that, in 
the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 262.  
The court elaborated, citing Morrison as providing the proper framework 
for deciding whether a statute regulates an activity that has the necessary 
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce.  Id.  Circuit Judge Oakes 
described the four factors Morrison presented for the court’s consideration 
as (1) whether the activity is economic or commercial in nature, (2) 
whether the statute includes a “jurisdictional element,” (3) whether 
Congress has provided express findings in support of the regulation, and 
(4) whether there is a sufficient connection between interstate commerce 
and the regulated activity.  Id. at 262-63 (citing Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 
1751). 
Applying the Morrison factors to FACE, the court found that the 
statute satisfied the first factor.  Id. at 262.  The court provided several 
arguments as to how the provision of reproductive health services is an 
economic activity, involving a staff, customer base, and supplies, for 
example.  Id.  Illegal protests, the court noted, had caused millions of 
dollars of damage to providers and had prevented many care-seekers from 
receiving treatment, and thus had an effect on the commercial activity of 
the clinics when viewed in broad terms.  Id.  The court distinguished FACE 
from the Violence Against Women Act, the statute found unconstitutional 
in Morrison, holding that FACE regulates misconduct that has an economic 
effect.  Id. 
Continuing, the court turned to the second Morrison consideration, 
whether FACE contains a jurisdictional element.  Id. at 263.  Though 
FACE did not contain an explicit jurisdictional element, the court held that 
this shortcoming was not necessarily fatal.  Id. (citing United States v. Bird, 
124 F.3d 667, 672-82 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
Judge Oakes, continuing to the third factor, found that Congress had 
sufficiently documented a need for the statute with extensive findings.  Id.  
Finally, the court contemplated the fourth Morrison factor: whether 
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the behavior FACE regulated 
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Id.  Judge Oakes, in 
finding a substantial effect on commerce, cited the extensive findings of 
Congress that clinic violence and intimidation had the effect of preventing 
access to reproductive health services.  Id.  Specifically, the court noted 
that clinic violence contributed to a shortage of doctors, making it difficult 
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for many women to seek reproductive health services.  Id. at 263-64.  The 
majority opined that the market for abortion services was national in 
nature, since both patients and doctors were known to travel interstate in 
order to participate in the service, which also indicated that the clinics, like 
many other businesses, were part of the “stream” of interstate commerce.  
Id. at 264. 
Judge Oakes, acknowledging another of Congress’s findings, 
observed that the pattern of violence against clinics was part of a national 
movement, having a detrimental national effect on the availability of health 
care.  Id.  The court highlighted recent incidents of clinic violence, and the 
resultant negative effects on abortion service availability in communities 
where such violence had occurred.  Id.  The court held that this evidence, 
taken as a whole, established that Congress had a rational basis to find that 
clinic violence had a substantial and direct effect on interstate commerce.  
Id. at 264-66.  The court pointed to the functionality test of Jones v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000), claiming that clinic protests were analogous 
to the arson of a commercial building, which the case had cited as an 
example of a sufficiently commerce-affecting activity.  Id. at 266.  Judge 
Oakes also likened the activity regulated by FACE to that in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), where the Court found 
that discrimination in local restaurants had an adverse effect on interstate 
commerce.  Id.  In light of these precedents, the court concluded that FACE 
was a “legitimate regulation of activity having a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 267. 
The court next rejected the defendants’ First Amendment claim, 
joining numerous other courts of appeals that have upheld FACE against 
freedom of expression challenges.  Id.  The court rebuffed the defendants’ 
claim that FACE was an unconstitutional viewpoint-based speech 
restriction.  Id.  Judge Oakes propounded that the statute governed all 
persons equally, without regard to the motivation for their actions, and was 
thus not viewpoint-based at all.  Id.  The majority held that FACE governs 
conduct, not speech, and Congress did not seek to discriminate against the 
protestors’ anti-abortion message.  Id.  Though acknowledging that the 
regulated activity might have “expressive components,” Judge Oakes 
asserted that government regulation was still appropriate since the statute 
met the requirements of strict scrutiny, as well as satisfied the three-part 
test for conduct with an expressive component found in United States v. 
O’Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  Id. at 268.  The court affirmed the district 
court’s ruling, rejecting the defendant’s claim that FACE violated the First 
Amendment.  Id. 
Judge Weis, in a dissenting opinion, argued that FACE did not survive 
constitutional scrutiny.  Id. at 268 (Weis, J., dissenting).  While 
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acknowledging that seven circuit courts had found FACE constitutional, 
Judge Weis noted that several of those decisions had come over the 
objections of dissenting judges who had argued FACE did not satisfy 
Lopez’s requirements.  Id.  Judge Weis also claimed that after Morrison, 
the Commerce Clause analysis of Lopez was necessarily strengthened, so 
the majority’s narrow reading of the Lopez holding was inappropriate.  Id. 
at 269 (Weis, J., dissenting).  The dissent charged that under this 
strengthened analysis, FACE did not have a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce and should be held unconstitutional.  Id.  Judge Weis suggested 
that the majority ignored the significance of these two Supreme Court 
cases, which was that Congress had limited authority to federalize local 
crime statutes under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 269-70 (Weis, J., 
dissenting).  Judge Weis analogized FACE to the statutes found 
unconstitutional in Lopez (Gun-Free School Zones Act) and Morrison 
(Violence Against Women Act [VAWA]), noting that all three statutes 
governed crimes typically regulated by the states, and each had an 
insufficient nexus with commercial activity.  Id. at 270 (Weis, J., 
dissenting) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
The dissent then analyzed FACE using Morrison’s four factors for 
reviewing whether Congress is constitutionally permitted to regulate an 
activity having a substantial impact on interstate commerce.  Id. at 270-71 
(Weis, J., dissenting).  In contrast to the majority, which found the factors 
satisfied, the dissent took issue with each of the four factors, finding that in 
enacting FACE Congress had overextended its authority to regulate 
interstate commerce.  Id.  Addressing the first factor, the dissent stressed 
that while abortion providers clearly provide a commercial service, the 
activities regulated by the statute, the protests, were not commercial in 
nature.  Id. at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting).  While acknowledging that clinic 
violence does have some economic impact, the dissent emphasized that the 
court must examine the conduct FACE regulates and focus on its police 
power character, not any incidental economic effects.  Id.  Judge Weis 
propounded that not every activity with an economic impact is a 
commercial activity.  Id..  Judge Weis distinguished Heart of Atlanta Motel 
from the present case, noting that the civil rights laws at issue regulated 
economic entities themselves, not the possible commercial conduct of third 
parties.  Id. at 270-71 (Weis, J., dissenting). 
Turning to Morrison’s second factor, the dissent argued that the lack 
of a jurisdictional element was a fatal flaw that could not be overcome by 
any amount of congressional findings.  Id. at 271 (Weis, J., dissenting).  
Judge Weis declared that a jurisdictional element was needed to ensure that 
the government could only invoke the statute with proof that interstate 
commerce was indeed being affected.  Id.  The dissent maintained that this 
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lack of jurisdictional element creates a statute that is too broad in scope, 
unconstitutionally allowing federal intervention into purely local matters.  
Id. 
Analyzing the third factor, Judge Weis criticized the majority’s 
reliance on legislative findings, arguing that Morrison held that deference 
to congressional findings could not take the place of a judicial inquiry into 
whether the effect on interstate commerce was substantial.  Id. at 272 
(Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent also found the findings themselves 
suspect, arguing that the alleged economic effects were not proximate 
enough to be correctly attributed to clinic violence.  Id. 
Finally, the dissent discussed Morrison’s fourth factor of whether 
there was a sufficient link between the regulated activity and interstate 
commerce, and concluded that any supposed link between clinic protests 
and commerce was too attenuated.  Id. at 272-73 (Weis, J., dissenting).  
The dissent reasoned that the economic activities cited by the majority—
the purchase of supplies and operation of a business, for example—were 
not enough to transform the regulated activity from a local concern into a 
national problem.  Id.  The dissent also chastised the majority for finding 
state treatment of the problem inadequate, and concluded by lambasting 
Congress for federalizing local criminal law outside the limits of the 
Commerce Clause.  Id. at 273-74 (Weis, J., dissenting).  Judge Weis 
concluded by noting that in addition to being unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, FACE should also be held unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, since there is no requisite state action.  Id. at 275 
(Weis, J., dissenting). 
The court’s interpretative analysis of the statutory damages question 
correctly weighed congressional intent as part of a plain meaning inquiry, 
and achieved an equitable result for plaintiffs and defendants: ensuring a 
remedy, but not one beyond what the legislature had in mind.  In disposing 
of the constitutional challenge, the court has acted unsurprisingly in 
aligning itself with seven other circuit courts in finding FACE a 
constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.  However, the court 
has undervalued a significant constitutional development that occurred 
after those cases were decided: the Supreme Court’s opinion in United 
States v. Morrison.  The majority echoes Justice Souter’s dissent in 
Morrison, calling for a deferential, rational basis review of congressional 
findings as part of the “substantial effects” inquiry.  However, the majority 
in Morrison rejected this standard of review, and determined that the 
judiciary’s role was not to rubber-stamp Congress’s findings, but rather to 
independently consider the question of whether there were indeed 
substantial effects on interstate commerce.   
The majority in Gregg appears to be making an independent inquiry 
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into Congress’s authority to enact FACE, but is in actuality incorrectly 
framing the issue.  The activity the statute regulates is not the commercial 
activity of a reproductive health clinic, but is the criminal activity of 
protestors.  This framing problem, combined with the lack of a 
jurisdictional element, makes FACE too similar to the VAWA examined  
in Morrison to survive constitutional scrutiny.  While well intentioned, and 
seemingly effective legislation, FACE cannot be maintained as a proper 
exercise of Congress’s commerce power after Morrison. 
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